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ABSTRACT 
What kind of role, if any, can immigration policies play in moving us towards global jus-
tice? On one view, the removal (or reduction) of restrictions on immigration might seem to 
constitute great progress in realizing the desired goal. After all, people want to emigrate 
mainly because they perceive that their prospects for better lives are more likely to be se-
cured elsewhere. If we remove restrictions on their ability to travel, would this not consti-
tute an advance over the status quo in which people are significantly prevented, through 
tough immigration restrictions, from seeking a better life for themselves and their depend-
ants? In particular, it might seem that a cosmopolitan must be committed to reducing re-
strictions on immigration. On one common account of what cosmopolitanism is, the central 
idea is that every person has global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern and is 
therefore entitled to equal respect and consideration no matter what her citizenship status 
or other affiliations happen to be.  It is frequently supposed that a cosmopolitan must be 
committed to more open borders, and that developed countries restricting entry to people 
from developing countries is unjust and inconsistent with a commitment to our equal 
moral worth.  However, as I argue, removing restrictions on immigration (in isolation) 
could constitute a considerable step backward for global justice.  In order to appreciate 
why this is the case, we need to review some relevant empirical evidence that our policy 
recommendations must take into account.  As we see, considerable benefits accrue to the 
immigrant and host nation, but significant costs must often be born in states of origin.  As 
one example, we consider the effects of remittances often believed to be highly beneficial to 
the global poor.  I discuss evidence indicating that patterns associated with remittances are 
not always at all desirable.  Migration policies need to be better managed so that they do 
benefit the relevant stakeholders.  In section 4 I give examples of how this might work. In 
section 5 we investigate what kinds of policy recommendations would be best given our 
findings. 
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1. Introduction 
 
What kind of role, if any, can immigration policies play in moving us towards 
global justice?1 On one view, the removal (or reduction) of restrictions on 
immigration might seem to constitute great progress in realizing the desired 
goal. After all, people want to emigrate mainly because they perceive that 
their prospects for better lives are more likely to be secured elsewhere. If we 
remove restrictions on their ability to travel, would this not constitute an ad-
vance over the status quo in which people are significantly prevented, 
through tough immigration restrictions, from seeking a better life for them-
selves and their dependants?   
In particular, it might seem that a cosmopolitan must be committed to re-
ducing restrictions on immigration. On one common account of what cos-
mopolitanism is, the central idea is that every person has global stature as the 
ultimate unit of moral concern and is therefore entitled to equal respect and 
consideration no matter what her citizenship status or other affiliations hap-
pen to be.2  It is frequently supposed that a cosmopolitan must be committed 
to more open borders, at least in ideal theory, and that developed countries 
restricting entry to people from developing countries is unjust and inconsis-
tent with a commitment to our equal moral worth.  Several theorists argue 
that justice requires (relatively) open borders and that restrictions on immi-
gration are unjust.3 In a classic piece, Joseph Carens argues that citizenship in 
Western democracies currently operates the way feudal privilege did in the 
past. Just as feudal birthright privilege served to determine one’s life chances, 
citizenship plays a similar role now. The current restrictions on immigration 
typical of Western democracies protect unjust privilege.4 
                                                 
1 By “global justice” I will mean a condition in which all people have the prospects for de-
cent lives. I elaborate at length on what this entails in a recent book. See Gillian Brock, 
Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
2 See, for instance, Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty” Ethics, 103 (1992): 
48-75. 
3 Bruce Ackerman Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1980); Veit Bader “Citizenship and exclusion: radical democracy, community and 
justice. Or, what is wrong with communitarianism?” Political Theory 23 (1995): 211-46; 
and Joseph Carens “Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders” Review of Politics 49 
(1987): 251-73. For discussion of more authors who hold such views see Jonathan Seglow 
“The Ethics of Immigration” Political Studies Review 3 (2005): 317-334, especially pp. 324-
329. 
4 Though he marshals a defense of this view from libertarian and utilitarian approaches, 
the argument he finds most illuminating is Rawlsian. He invites us to assume a global view 
of the original position and he presumes that the two principles of justice Rawls endorses 
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Even if a case could be made that ideal justice requires open borders, this 
tells us little about what our non-ideal world current policy on immigration 
should be. The view that the best response to a history of closed borders is to 
remove restrictions on immigration faces considerable difficulty given some of 
the effects of immigration I go on to review. In this paper I am concerned 
with recommending policy that is justified for “here and now”.  In this do-
main of “real world” or “transitional” justice, matters are more complex and 
our policies should take account of this complexity. Removing restrictions on 
immigration without taking further steps to improve the prospects for decent 
lives in countries that people want to leave could constitute a considerable 
step backward for global justice.  In order to appreciate why this is the case, 
we need to review some relevant empirical evidence that our policy recom-
mendations must take into account.  As we see, considerable benefits accrue to 
the immigrant and host nation, but significant costs must often be born in 
states of origin.  As one example, we consider the effects of remittances often 
believed to be highly beneficial to the global poor.  I discuss evidence indicat-
ing that patterns associated with remittances are not always at all desirable.  
Migration policies need to be better managed so that they do benefit the rele-
vant stakeholders.  In section 4 I give examples of how this might work.  In 
section 5 we investigate what kinds of policy recommendations would be best 
given our findings. 
 
 
2. A survey of some realistic options for here and now 
 
If all border controls were demolished, how many people would actually 
move? Though estimates vary,5 there is interesting evidence to suggest that 
________________________________________ 
for liberal societies would be chosen. Would freedom of movement between states be en-
dorsed? One has only to consider the importance of the right to migrate freely within a 
given society to realize that the very same considerations would imply that freedom of 
movement across state borders is similarly important. The idea is that freedom of move-
ment to pursue economic, cultural, or personal projects is central to pursuing one’s life 
plans. Realising this, behind an appropriate veil of ignorance one would choose open bor-
ders, or so Carens argues. 
5 United Nations Population Division estimates World Migrant Stock for 2005 at 190 633 
564. The chart put out by the UN Population Division in October, 2006 uses the 2005 fig-
ures, and can be accessed at:  
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006Migration_Chart/2006IttMig_chart.ht
mAccording to Castles and Miller, the United Nations estimated that in 2002 there were 
185 million migrants. It is not clear how many of these were immigrants. Presumably, far 
less. For more estimates see S. Castles and M. J. Miller The Age of Migration, 3rd edition, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), p. 4. 
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people would move in fairly limited numbers.6 Yet, developed countries spend 
vast amounts to keep borders closed. Despite this enormous cost of trying to 
keep people out at borders, in a post 9/11 world it would be futile to argue for 
removing all border controls. People’s interests in security and a peaceful way 
of life now rule this out. So the relevant questions are ones about what restric-
tions on entry there should be, not whether there should be any restrictions at 
all, and in particular, about whether countries should be more generous in the 
number of immigrants permitted to enter developed countries. 
Most countries have annual maxima for the number of immigrants they 
will admit. One option, the one assumed to accord best with cosmopolitan 
goals, is that these should be raised, but there are other policies we should also 
entertain. Here are some: 
 
O1. Stay with the status quo: stay with current quotas and levels of 
immigration admitting current levels of potential citizens. 
O2. Increase the number of people who may be permitted as poten-
tial citizens. 
O3. Decrease the number of people who may be permitted as poten-
tial citizens. 
O4. Stay with the current status quo for admitting potential citizens, 
but provide more temporary permits to migrants for work purposes. 
O5. Consider the potential for “win-win” arrangements that benefit 
home and host countries, immigrants, and locals. 
 
Before looking at increasing, decreasing, or staying with the status quo 
with respect to quotas, we should examine the current situation. Is immigra-
tion generally a positive, negative, or neutral phenomenon for those affected? 
There are three important groups to be considered: the emigrants, those in the 
host countries (the countries to which the emigrants go), and those in the 
home countries (the countries they exit). I consider first some of the impacts 
for those in the host countries, starting with the benefits. 
                                                 
6 Teresa Hayter Open Borders: The Case against Immigration Controls (London: Pluto 
Press, 2000), p. 153. For instance, quite a few countries had open border arrangements 
with former colonies in the past, which allowed open migration from the Caribbean be-
tween 1950 and 1980. In the period, only 0.6% of the Caribbean population moved to the 
US and England, though there were clear economic attractions for doing so. Citing evi-
dence from Bob Sutcliffe, Teresa Hayter extrapolates that the figure today would be 
around 24 million per year, which amounts to growth of around 2.4% in the population of 
industrialized countries. Bob Sutcliffe, Nacido en otra parte: Un ensayo sobre la migracion 
international, el desarollo y la equidad (Bilbao: Hegoa, 1998). 
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There is much agreement among economists that immigration increases 
the wealth of host countries.7 Though the overall economic effect may be very 
positive, some worry that the distribution of those gains is uneven. In particu-
lar, the concern is that some citizens bear heavy costs, such as loss of jobs, 
lowering of wages, or increased competition. Let us investigate these claims 
further. 
Do immigrants take jobs away from local workers? In many cases, the jobs 
immigrant workers take up are perceived as dangerous, dirty, or demeaning 
ones that local workers (apparently) prefer not to do (not at prevailing wages, 
at any rate). Some argue that, far from taking work away from others, immi-
grants actually create jobs for others. Because immigrants need housing, 
transportation, food, and so forth, the number of jobs expands.8 Indeed, im-
migrants often start new businesses and thereby create jobs.9 
Do immigrants lower wages? Some evidence indicates that wages in certain 
sectors (such as agriculture, construction, and service industries, especially 
restaurants) are lowered by the arrival of many immigrants.10 Some unskilled 
workers do suffer from the additional competition, because the newcomers are 
typically willing to work for less. However, this may provide more incentives 
for citizens to acquire further skills and, thus, be positioned to fill better pay-
ing jobs. Immigration may therefore result in more investment in self-
education, which leads to increased earning power. Even if immigration re-
sults in lower wages for some, this is not necessarily a bad thing. The lower 
                                                 
7 Mark Kleinman “The Economic Impact of Labour Migration” in Sarah Spencer (ed.) The 
Politics of Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2003), pp. 59-74; Julian Simon, The Economic Consequences of Immigration (Basil Black-
well, 1989), Appendix C; also Open Letter to US President and Congress, 19 June 2006, 
with more than 500 signatories (mostly academics), including 5 Nobel Laureates: 
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1727 
and accompanying press release: 
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/news_detail.asp?newsID=74 
8 Peter Stalker The No-Nonsense Guide to International Migration (London: Verso, 2001), 
pp. 64-65. Those US cities with a higher proportion of immigrants do not have higher rates 
of unemployment, according to research by Stephen Moore cited in “Making and Remak-
ing America” by Philip Martin and Peter Duignan, Hoover Essays, HE25, 
www.hoover.org, ISBN 0-8179-4462-1, p. 35. For similar results in Europe, see Stalker, 
The No-Nonsense Guide to International Migration, p. 78 also Castles and Miller, The Age of 
Migration, p. 194. 
9 Seglow, “The Ethics of Immigration”, p. 326; also Nigel Harris Thinking the Unthinkable: 
The Immigration Myth Exposed (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), pp. 57-60. 
10 George Borjas, “Immigration and Welfare: A Review of the Evidence” in The Debate in 
the United States over Immigration, eds. Peter Duignan and Lewis Gann (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1998), pp. 121-44. 
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wages may cause firms to expand in a particular area, creating more jobs. 
Prices of consumer goods may also fall. Immigrants can also contribute to ris-
ing wages if they open up new markets and opportunities. 
There are several other ways immigrants can benefit developed countries. 
Demographic changes are challenging the continued viability of the social se-
curity arrangements in many parts of the Western World.11 For instance, in 
1960 there were about 5 workers for every social security recipient, but when 
the baby boomers retire it is predicted there will be approximately 2.5 workers 
to support each social security recipient.12 Such a situation would inevitably 
mean either higher taxes or cuts in social security, unless more young adult 
workers are admitted.13  
Immigrants can provide benefits. Do they pose costs, such as increased 
welfare dependency and crime, environmental damage, or undesirable cultural 
change? Immigrants do not use welfare services or contribute more to crime in 
significantly greater proportions than the general population.14 The more dif-
ficult accusation to rebut conclusively may be that immigrants pose cultural 
costs. One concern is that immigrants threaten the nation to which they move 
by undermining the host culture or the sense of solidarity citizens feel toward 
                                                 
11 Steven Camarota “Immigration in an Aging Society: Workers, Birth Rates, and Social 
Security”, Center for Immigration Studies, Backgrounder, April 2005, available at: 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back505.html; and Ronald Lee and Timothy Miller “Im-
migration, Social Security, and Broader Fiscal Impacts” AEA Papers and Proceedings: 
New Issues in Immigration 90/2 (2000): 350-354. 
12 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insur-
ance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds (2007), p. 48, accessible at this site: 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR07/. 
13 Some dispute that the US needs large numbers of immigrants for this purpose; for in-
stance, Roy Howard Beck, The Case Against Immigration: The Moral, Economic, Social, 
and Environmental Reasons for Reducing U.S. Immigration back to Traditional Levels (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1996). Indeed, it is not easy to find arguments that increased immi-
gration will substantially help with this problem. Lee and Miller “Immigration, Social Se-
curity, and Broader Fiscal Impacts” acknowledge that increased immigration would have 
a positive affect on Social Security, but not a large one. For arguments that immigration 
would not help the social security problem (in the US, EU, and Japan), see Hans Fehr, Sa-
bine Jokisch, Laurence Kotlikoff, “The role of immigration in dealing with the developed 
world’s demographic transition,” Finanzarchiv, 60:3 (2004), 296-324. A version is available 
at: 
http://64.233.179.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:yRjFjJu3n6MJ:www.wifak.uni-
wuerzburg.de/wilan/wifak/vwl/fiwi/forschung/ig.pdf+. 
14 See for instance, Stalker, The No-Nonsense guide to International Migration, p. 82. See 
also Harris, Thinking the Unthinkable, for claims that this issue is a ‘red herring’ contrary 
to popular prejudices. 
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each other. Is this fear warranted? There are nations that would be hypocriti-
cal to make very much of this (assuming for the moment that it is true), 
namely, all the nations comprised largely of immigrants, notably the USA, 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Nevertheless, concerns of this kind 
weighed heavily with many throughout the histories of those nations, leading 
to exclusionary policies that aimed to prevent immigration by people thought 
to be “unassimilatable”. As we see over time, however, all nations are “works-
in-progress”, and their characters change. The contribution of newer groups to 
this process is as likely to be positive as negative. 
I assume that immigrants, all things considered, perceive themselves to 
benefit from immigration, or they would not remain in the host country. 
Much more problematic is whether immigration benefits those who remain in 
the countries of origin. The focus in this short paper will be on effects of re-
mittances often thought to be a considerable net benefit to the global poor. 
 
 
3. The advantages and disadvantages of remittances 
 
Remittances, the money that foreign nationals send to individuals within 
their countries of origin, are an enormous source of assistance for those in de-
veloping countries. In many countries, the money received through remit-
tances exceeds official foreign aid, all foreign direct investment, and revenue 
from tourism, revenue from the largest export for that country, and accounts 
for at least 10% of GDP.15 
Migrants send money back to their country of origin through formal chan-
nels (such as banks or money transfer services), and sometimes through more 
informal methods (such as carrying it home themselves or via friends). This 
makes the value of remittances difficult to measure, but reliable estimates put 
the amount at around $111 billion in 2001, with a tendency to increase sub-
stantially every year.16 About 65% of remittances go to developing countries. 
The Philippines’ most lucrative export is their expatriate workers, who 
provide skilled cheap labor all over the world. Around 7 million (about 10% of 
the population) work in about 149 countries. Mexicans working in the US 
send approximately $10 billion back to Mexico every year, an amount that is 
                                                 
15 See the Inter-American Development Bank web-site at http://www.iadb.org for the 
most current estimates. The figures cited were retrieved in 2005 and were found in a docu-
ment “Remittances as a Development Tool” at  
http://www.iadb.org/mif/v2/remittances.html#top. 
16 This is the World Bank estimate for 2001 cited at 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?id=138 . 
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twice the value of agricultural exports and much more than tourist revenue.17 
In Mexico, more than one out of every 10 families rely on remittances as their 
primary source of income. In El Salvador, 28% of adults receive remittances. 
As a percentage of GDP, remittances can also be extremely important; for in-
stance, remittances to Haiti make up 24.2% of GDP, in Jordan, 22.8%, in 
Tonga 39%, in Bangladesh 18.9%, and in Nicaragua 16.2%.18 
Unlike foreign aid, which typically goes to governments rather than poor 
citizens, remittances put money directly in the pockets of poor citizens. This 
can be an advantage, especially when governments are corrupt. However, it 
often proves less advantageous when the money is spent mostly on private 
consumption, such as clothing, consumer goods, and improving housing. Some 
argue that private consumption need not conflict with socially useful ends. 
Arguably, increased consumption of local goods promotes opportunities for 
further jobs and new markets. When remittances are spent on consumption of 
domestically produced goods or services there can be multiplier effects and 
additional tax receipts.19 However, private remittances do not tend to go on 
public goods, such as infrastructural projects, schools, roads, health care, and 
sanitation facilities, which have a more significant impact on tackling struc-
tural poverty.  
Do remittances really go to poor people, or rather to the better-off families 
of migrants, hence increasing local inequality? Migrants are typically drawn 
not from the poorest households in feeder countries, but from the better off as 
measured in terms of education and income level.20 This selection means that 
direct effects on the very poor through remittances may be limited.21 The ef-
fects on structural poverty are likely to be only indirect, through increased 
demand for labor-intensive services, such as construction. 
                                                 
17 Devesh Kapur and John McHale, “Migration’s New Payoff,” Foreign Policy, Nov/Dec 
(2003), Issue 139: 48-57, p. 50. 
18 International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook 2002; World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2002 cited at 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?id+138. 
19 Mihir Desai, Devesh Kapur and John McHale. “The Fiscal Impact of High Skilled Emi-
gration: Flows of Indians to the U.S.,” WCFIA Working Paper No. 03-01, Harvard Uni-
versity (2003); also Edward Taylor “International Migration and National Development,” 
Population Index 62: 2 (1996): 181-212. 
20 Devesh Kapur “Remittances: The New Development Mantra?” Paper prepared for the 
G-24 Technical Meeting, available at: www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2420045_en.pdf , 
pp.16-17. 
21 Ibid. 
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Do remittances enhance people’s abilities to seek a livelihood? About 10 
percent of remittances go on saving or investment; the rest tends to go on con-
sumer goods and daily living expenses.22 More problematic is the cycle of de-
pendency that too often is set up: “The easy money of remittances tends to 
create a cycle in which people have to leave to find work, and no economic 
development occurs. The brightest and most energetic young people move 
away, depleting human capital. In Pozorrubio, there is apparently little 
trickle-down effect for families who do not have a remittance sender, thereby 
creating a growing income divide of remittance haves and have-nots”.23 As 
an example, consider how about $1 million per day flows into the Mexican 
state of Zacatecas from former residents, an amount that is more than that re-
ceived from the Mexican government. 24  But this has also produced moral 
hazards. Many young men prefer to remain unemployed and wait for a chance 
to migrate rather than take up jobs at local wage levels.25 
Several scholars argue that remittances reduce incentives to work and de-
press economic activity.26 Remittance receivers are also more likely to want 
to emigrate than the general population.27 This process is called “cumulative 
causation” and can make both source and destination areas more dependent 
on continuing such arrangements.28 Businesses in the host countries come to 
rely on the availability of migrant workers, and the countries from which they 
depart may neglect areas with high concentrations of migrant laborers on the 
grounds that, since so many earn income elsewhere, regional needs are ade-
                                                 
22 Brenda Walker “Remittances Becoming More Entrenched: The Worldwide Cash Flow 
Continues to Grow” at http://www.limitstogrowth.org/WEB-text/remittances.html. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Brenda Walker “Remittances Becoming More Entrenched: The Worldwide Cash Flow 
Continues to Grow” at http://www.limitstogrowth.org/WEB-text/remittances.html. 
25 Kapur, “Remittances”, p.20. 
26 See Deborah Waller Meyers “Migrant Remittances to Latin America: Reviewing the 
Literature” Working Paper: Inter-American Dialogue/The Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, 
1998, available at: http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/21608-Meyers_Migrant.htm, 
p. 8; also Els de Graauw “Government Courtship of Migradollars: International Migrants’ 
Remittances and Policy Intervention in the Case of Contemporary Mexico” paper pre-
sented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association – Chicago, 
April 9th, p. 22. 
27 Edwin Rubenstein “Remittances Are Good for Them and Us...Up To a Point” at 
http://www.vdare.com/rubenstein/remittance.htm. 
28 Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Grame Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pelligrino, and 
J. Edward Taylor, “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal,” Popu-
lation and Development Review 19, no. 3 (September 1993): 431-66. 
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quately satisfied. Less government money flows into such regions, thus forc-
ing more people to become migrant workers. In Mexico, emigration to the US 
often has the effect of encouraging more people to emigrate, consequently 
crippling the region’s ability to develop its own economy.29 
However, there are positive signs that remittances can be better harnessed 
to help those in the feeder state.30 For instance, in Mexico, some public 
works, such as roads and schools, are funded via remittances sent to home-
towns. In some cases, matching funds have been offered for financing public 
works that are in part sponsored from remittance money.31 Indeed, in some 
cases every dollar remitted to hometown associations is matched with a dollar 
each from the Mexican federal, state, and local authorities. This has trans-
lated into some local success stories.32  
Remittances can be a mixed blessing in further ways. For instance, if this 
source of revenue is not available, citizens may turn to their governments and 
expect more of them. According to some, the easy flow of money that remit-
tances provide allows Mexico’s ‘kleptocratic elite’ to avoid reform.33 Were it 
not so forthcoming, Mexicans would expect more from their government to 
provide the services and investment necessary for a flourishing economy. 
Some argue that governments are therefore exploiting their migrant work-
ers.34 
Time spent away can dramatically affect the willingness to remit.35 As 
migrants become more committed to their host country, remittances decline 
over time. Remittance flows are at their strongest between three and five 
years after departure.  Once permanent residency is granted, remittances of-
ten fall off considerably.36 Policies endorsing migration for work purposes 
with a duration of no more than 5 years are optimal for those back home. 
                                                 
29 Stalker, The No-Nonsense Guide to International Migration, p. 113. Communities that 
have high rates of emigration create a culture of emigration. 
30 Meyers, “Migrant Remittances to Latin America”, p. 12. 
31 Walker, “Remittances Becoming More Entrenched”. 
32 Stalker, The No-Nonsense Guide to International Migration, p. 117. Also, Rafael Alarcon, 
“The Development of Home Town Associations in the United States and the Use of Social 
Remittances in Mexico,” mimeo.  
33 See Rubenstein “Remittances Are Good for Them and Us...Up To a Point”. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Fernando Lozano-Ascencio “Bringing It Back Home: Remittances to Mexico from Mi-
grant workers in the United States”(San Diego: Center for U.S. Mexican Studies, 1993); 
also Meyers, “Migrant Remittances to Latin American”, pp. 14-15. 
36 Richard Black “Soaring Remittances Raise New Issues” at 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=127 
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Such policies might also change expenditure of remittances, channeling them 
into opportunities that would generate employment on the migrants’ re-
turn.37  
Some of the main negative effects observed for home countries, then, are 
these: (1) the inflow of funds can create dependence for recipients; (2) depend-
ence encourages further migration, especially among the working age, produc-
tive adults; (3) both home and host countries become dependent on continu-
ing the arrangements; (4) economic activity can become depressed in countries 
of origin, which encourages more emigration; (5) needed economic reforms are 
neglected, as is the creation of rewarding opportunities in the home country; 
and (6) remittances decline over time. 
Furthermore, remittances may have a positive effect on transient poverty, 
but do not by themselves reduce structural poverty.38 To address structural 
poverty, wide-ranging economic changes are needed and these may “still re-
quire external financial resources in the form of budgetary support to gov-
ernments in many poor countries”.39 Clearly, also there is much more that 
can be done to improve the situation in the home country, to move more de-
sirable jobs to the people rather than moving the people to more desirable 
jobs. For instance, facilitating investment coupled with better trading ar-
rangements might well bring more jobs, higher wages, and less incentive for 
people to emigrate, 40 as I discuss elsewhere.41 
 
                                                 
37 There also needs also to be some government and community-based help to encourage 
and reward investment and development in the home country, rather than assuming indi-
vidual migrants can manage this by themselves. Notable among the needed measures is 
improvement in the availability of credit to locals in developing countries, especially to 
start small businesses and to get help with training. 
38 Kapur “Remittances”, p. 2. See also, Nancy Birdsall, Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subra-
manian “How to Help Poor Countries” Foreign Affairs 84/4 (July-August 2005): 136-153. 
39 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
40 U.S. Commission for the Study of International Migration and Co-operative Economic 
Development, 1990, p. xv. Further support can be found in other places, such as: Car-
baugh, “Is International Trade a Substitute for Migration?” 
41. See Gillian Brock, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). A qualification of the view worth noting is that some countries may simply be 
unviable economic entities, such as small island economies like Cape Verde, where over 
65% of households receive remittances and this is their only real source of income. (Kapur, 
“Remittances”, p. 10). For such places, there is no viable economic activity of the kind 
necessary to sustain all citizens. Perhaps remittances really are their only hope. Exemp-
tions from term restrictions on migrant labor from such places may be permissible. Few 
countries are like this, however. 
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4. Option (O5): Exploring beneficial opportunities three relevant stakeholders: 
migrants, host, and feeder countries 
 
As we have seen, there can be considerable disadvantages in developed coun-
tries permitting more immigrants from developing countries. However, this is 
not to say that in all cases developing countries must end up as losers when 
migrants work elsewhere. We should be open to any creative possibilities that 
might arise that will yield net benefits to home and host countries, to locals 
and immigrants.42  Here are some examples. 
1. For recruiting (say) health care workers trained in a developing country 
(“Developing”), the developed country (“Developed”) pays compensation to 
Developing at a rate of (say) five times what it costs to train that worker in 
Developing. If there is a limit set on how many such workers Developed may 
recruit, there may be considerable advantages to Developing in allowing such 
a scheme, because with the proceeds they can train many more health care 
workers. Developed might be interested in this scheme if the amount they pay 
to Developing is still less than the cost of training the needed workers in De-
veloped (or they simply cannot manage to attract enough locals to train in 
Developed). The locals in Developed also benefit in gaining more trained staff. 
However Developing is also better off since it can train more healthcare work-
ers with the additional revenue.  
2. Developed can recruit migrants from Developing for training purposes 
— for instance, to learn sustainable forestry or mining skills — and then, once 
trained, part of their new job would be to go back to the feeder country to 
teach the newly acquired skills to locals so that a successful operation is set up 
in Developing. Schemes of this kind could benefit the locals from Developing 
who receive training, who in turn train others and create job opportunities 
with the base activities in Developing. This could benefit locals in Developed 
because it creates new markets for those who do the training and those who 
subsidize the training also get access to further opportunities (or perhaps new 
sources of raw materials) in Developing.43 
                                                 
42 These suggestions are all very small-scale. They would not amount to a sizable percent-
age of the population, and clear benefits accrue for both host and home countries and their 
inhabitants. Most importantly, they are carefully managed and monitored to ensure bene-
fits do accrue to feeder nations. 
43 A variant on this second option is this: an immigrant from Developing proposes to set 
up a business in Developed that employs local people and migrants. Migrants learn skills 
from locals that they then take back to the developing country. The business also paves 
the way for locals to go to the migrants’ country of origin and train others, or fosters other 
productive links. Building these kinds of partnerships could be profitable to all. This case 
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3. Migrants could help create opportunities in more depressed parts of 
countries. Migrants need accommodation, transport, food, and a host of other 
goods and services. Migrants’ needs could stimulate local provision for those 
needs, thereby helping struggling regional economies.  Admitting more people 
into these struggling parts of the country may be of considerable benefit to 
the region, especially when there is no longer the critical mass of people neces-
sary for provision of certain crucial services, such as, schools or hospitals. If a 
severely overpopulated developing country, such as China, were to send some 
of its low or averagely skilled workers to an area struggling to survive in a de-
veloped country, such as parts of the South Island in New Zealand, there may 
be important gains all around. In particular, the citizens who live in such re-
gions are made better off because otherwise, in the long run, they would have 
no option but to move to more economically active areas.  And if China loses 
some low to averagely skilled workers, there are no important losses that 
those left behind in the country of origin must bear. 
To conclude this section, there may be immigration programs that enhance 
everyone’s prospects for decent lives. In particular, if they increase opportuni-
ties for people back in the country of origin, they should be investigated and 
encouraged provided they would not detract from more fundamental changes 
necessary to enhance the prospects for decent lives for residents of developing 
countries. 
 
 
5. Analysis and Conclusions 
 
As we have seen, there are a number of benefits that could potentially accrue 
to the host and home countries from immigration policies, but considerable 
drawbacks that must be acknowledged as well, including bad incentive effects, 
cycles of dependency, neglect, and lack of needed development. Policies en-
couraging migrant labor and remittances can be a way to help developing 
countries, but can also serve to exacerbate the problems. If fixed term con-
tracts (with term limits) are imposed on migrant workers’ period of work in 
other countries, migrant labor policies can be more positively harnessed. Be-
cause remittances tend to drop off to home countries after a certain period (of 
roughly 5 years), fixed term contracts with term limits might be best for the 
remittees. They also allow a new crop of workers to set off for another country 
just as the old crop would be starting to make more permanent homes for 
themselves elsewhere, which would disincline them to send money home. Fur-
thermore, fixed term contracts with term limits provide incentives to think 
________________________________________ 
sets up “circular flows of people”, which could have good consequences for all. But we need 
to think also about why we should not prefer to set up circular flows of goods just as easily. 
G. BROCK 
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about how to use the money more effectively, especially in terms of investing 
in opportunities that will provide returning migrants and their families with 
better prospects on repatriation. It also forces governments not to ignore areas 
that have heavy migrant flows. Such migration policies, could constitute a 
positive step for developing countries, provided remittances are well spent on 
addressing the structural causes of poverty. All this suggests we can marshal a 
qualified defense of option (O4), outlined in section 2.44   
What should we do about policies (O1), (O2), and (O3), which endorse de-
veloped countries increasing, decreasing, or staying with the current quotas 
on immigration? In the absence of more compelling  research results about the 
effects of either generally increasing or decreasing quota levels, perhaps we 
should not advocate any of (O1), (O2), or (O3), if we are not more confident 
that it will help in the long run. From the evidence surveyed so far, immigra-
tion, on balance, does more for host countries and immigrants, (for instance, 
as we saw, they contribute to economic growth and their taxes can help sup-
port ageing populations) but it is not clear that it does enough for those re-
maining in the feeder country, even taking into account the net effects of re-
mittances. 
Some may argue that, since host countries and immigrants gain, the host 
country or the immigrants should be required to pay compensation to the 
feeder country equal at least to the size of the benefits received from the coun-
try of origin. Perhaps increased immigration can be endorsed if poor countries 
get adequately compensated for any relevant losses. If the compensation is 
sufficiently great, this alternative should be considered. But now we have en-
tered the realm of the fifth set of policy options (O5); namely, searching for 
win-win possibilities. I suggested there are opportunities worth exploring. 
Here we will want to see whether there are ways to further the interests of 
citizens in both destination countries and countries of origin. In section 4, I 
outlined several ways policies might contribute positively to all affected.  But 
notice what is going on when we pursue this strategy: we are checking that 
benefits accrue to the feeder country and trying to ensure they match the 
benefits the host country and emigrant receive.  And this is what has been 
missing in some of the cosmopolitan analyses of immigration so far.  If every-
one has global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern, then those left 
behind deserve more consideration than they have currently received.45  (Ar-
                                                 
44 For even further gains, consideration should be given to taxing remittances or requiring 
migrants to pay taxes on wages earned abroad. 
45 For some examples that do not give sufficient attention to the interests of those in 
feeder countries see Darrel Moellendorf Cosmopolitan Justice (Boulder, CO: Westveiw 
Press, 2002): 61-67. 
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guably, since they are typically amongst the worst off of the three relevant 
stakeholders, their interests should receive much more weight.)  What I am 
recommending is that migration processes are better managed so that they 
take account of the interests of migrants, but do not also neglect relevant 
other stakeholders such as those to whom the migrants also have responsibili-
ties.  Any real world immigration policies we endorse for here and now will re-
quire a level of attention to the details, especially concerning proposed and 
likely impacts of any cross border movements for non-departing citizens in 
feeder countries. 
 
  
 
